



Force Headquarters
EUNAVFOR ASPIDES



ASPIDES	Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping SAILING INFORMATION N°5	5th May 2024
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SAILING INFORMATION:

N°5

DTG:

050700Z MAY 2024

VALIDITY:

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE

TO:

EU MEMBERS OF EU NAVFOR ASPIDES
MSCHOA

FOR REFERENCE:

EU SHIPPING COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE AREA
EU MARINE TRAFFIC AND MARITIME CLUSTER

REFERENCES

- ATP 02.1 “Naval Cooperation And Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) – Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers”;
- BMP5 “Best Management Practices to Deter and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabic Sea”;
- Technical Agreement between Operation ATALANTA and Operation ASPIDES regarding the use and contribution of ATALANTA’s Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHoA) to ASPIDES;
- SAILING INFORMATION Nr. 01-02-03-04 by EU NAVFOR ASPIDES NCAGS

GENERAL SITUATION:

The improvement of weather condition has resulted into an increased activity with UAVs that have once again raised the overall level of attention in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. In particular this last week has witnessed the resurgence of Houthi attacks in term of frequency, reach and effectiveness. In the Red Sea, UAVs and missiles are still used with different reach and both day and night with no preferred timeframes. Therefore, in order to minimize unnecessary risk during close protection all units will be asked to transit south of IRTC.

In the last days, the potential reach of Houthis has increased. Consistent with their narrative, they have reported to have conducted a potential UAV attack 200 Nm off Socotra. The event is still under investigation and the outcomes will soon be shared with the maritime cluster as they may encompass potential mitigations.

Whereas the Israeli-Hamas conflict seems to be directed towards a turning point, Houthi have continued with their narrative announcing a new phase in their activities against the freedom of navigation with the definition of some criteria that have already been incorporated into the Force Headquarter risk assessment process. At this regard are of utmost value the information provided by shipping companies asking for protection, that allow the Force

Headquarters to correctly assess the risk level and consequently to set the most appropriate protection up for merchant and commercial vessels transiting the High Threat Area (HTA).

On that specific topic, Ansar Allah have recently set up a *Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center* (HOCC) that threaten merchant shipping approaching to the Southern Red Sea both in channel 16 than via e-mail. Shipping companies are encouraged to share such information with the security providers as they will concur to the overall risk assessment and will be fundamental to provide the best possible support. Such information, that most likely represents a precursor sign of a possible targeting, should be highlighted will be kept only within military community and for risk assessment purposes as it is not meant to be shared for public purposes.


In accordance with incidents records the area South of parallel 16°N and West of meridian 45°E has still to be considered as a High-Threat Area (HTA). In this area, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES will be entitle to provide area and/or close protection on tactical contingent basis.

EUNAVFOR ASPIDES is continuously assessing the maritime security situation to safeguard freedom of navigation (FoN), to ensure the free flow of commerce, and to protect merchant vessels, personnel, with special regard to EU interests.

ROUTE:

During passage you are advise to pass westward to following area:

POINT	LAT	LONG
A	13°40.972'N	043°16.198'E
B	13°40.972'N	042°37.010'E
C	13°59.373'N	042°21.867'E
D	16°12.630'N	041°10.970'E
E	16°12.630'N	042°48.311'E



SPECIAL ADVICE/PROCEDURES:

Recommendations below can be adopted in both cases of isolate transit and in close protection with ASPIDES naval ships notwithstanding further information provided by the warship on necessity base. All the below mentioned actions should be executed where no impact to the safety of navigation is concerned:

a. Before entering into HTA

- register on MSCHOA website;
- To request close protection from an ASPIDES naval ship, please fill in the dedicated form;
- Shipping Companies:
 - Following most recent threats (3 May) conduct thorough analysis of past port calls made in Israeli ports, Med or Red-Sea included, not at vessel-level but at company-level;
 - conduct a risk assessment of all their vessels and especially those that may have previous US, UK, or Israel ownership or associations:
 - Note that most recent attacks have been against vessels that have changed ownership in last 2 months;
 - If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to MSCHOA prior to transiting the threat area;
 - Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels;
 - Review digital footprint;
- consider to review security plan with appropriate measures;

b. When approaching the HTA (24h before or after last port visit if closer)

- consider to switch OFF the Automatic Identification System (AIS);
- alter course and speed to achieve at least a distance of 5Nm from the position, Houthis can estimate using last course and speed reported by AIS or other sources.

c. When in the HTA

- switch off all unnecessary lights;
- plan your route as far as possible from Yemeni coastline (when out of TSS);
- execute frequent changes in course and speed in order to hamper targeting process;
- do not use VHF for communications with protecting ships but refer to e-mails, satellite phones or INTERCO (No THURAYA).

d. Throughout the entire voyage

- ignore VHF calls and e-mails from “Yemeni Navy” or HOCC reporting them if happen;
- ignore phone calls out not coming from protecting ships as the coordination with other NCAGS realities in the area is executed by ASPIDES FHQ;
- report any kind of incidents, unmanned vehicles sightings or suspicious activities (with records/pictures if possible). Indeed, an effective lookout is paramount for ship protection;
- in case of close protection any actions conducted by Private Maritime Security Companies (ISO 28007 – I:2015) have to be coordinated with the Commanding Officer of ASPIDES naval ship who has a clearer view of tactical situation.
- in case of any unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
 - maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
 - do not touch or try to dismantle any debris

- be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
- request assistance through MSCHOA, ask for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD).

REQUEST FOR PROTECTION

ASPIDES webpage is available in the MSCHOA website. You can find additional information about ASPIDES threat update and close protection request format on the website <https://at-sea.mschoa.org/aspides/>.

All requests for protection have to be returned to postmaster@mschoa.org (24/7)

CONTACTS

Below are reported the contact points for the implementation of the security framework:

ASPIDES Force Headquarter (afloat) on board ITS FASAN telephone watch (24/7):

Tel: +39063680 8285

Mail: aspides.fhq.ncags@mschoa.org